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871 
I’M IN THE PURSUIT OF YOUR PROPERTY: HOW THE 
GOVERNMENT DISGUISES A TAKING 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK                              
APPELLATE DIVISION, THIRD DEPARTMENT 
Matter of Nelson v. City of New York1 
(decided May 8, 2014) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the United States an individual’s right to property is con-
sidered a bundle of rights.2  These rights are not absolute and may be 
limited or removed under certain circumstances.  To protect the prop-
erty owner under such circumstances, the United States Constitution 
provides that, “private property shall not be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”3  A taking is defined as a governmental 
encroachment on an individual’s property.4  A physical encroachment 
on one’s property does not normally present an issue.  However, is-
sues arise when laws or regulation interfere with a property owner’s 
use and enjoyment of his or her realty.5  A regulatory or de facto tak-
ing is defined as a governmental encroachment which imposes condi-
tions and regulations on the land that limit its use.6 
Paula Nelson, a property owner, alleged a violation of her 
Fifth Amendment rights due to the de facto taking of her property by 
the enactment of the 1997 Watershed Memorandum Agreement 
 
1 985 N.Y.S.2d 329 (2014). 
2 63C AM. JUR. 2D Property § 1 (2015) (“The legal definition of property most often refers 
not to a particular physical object, but rather to the legal bundle of rights recognized in that 
object, which bundle of rights includes the rights to possess, use, and dispose of a particular 
article.”). 
3 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
4 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435-38 (1982); see 
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001). 
5 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426-27. 
6 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414-16 (1922). 
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(“MOA”).7  A watershed is an “area that drains to a common water-
way, such as a stream, lake, estuary, wetland, aquifer, or even the 
ocean” and can be directly affected by our actions.8  The MOA gave 
the City of New York (“the City”) the ability to acquire an interest in 
an individual’s property via an easement.9  Nelson’s property is in-
cluded in the watershed and within the area affected by the MOA.10  
The petitioner’s contention concerned a resolution that was added to 
the Agreement, which provided that the municipality could exclude 
certain properties from being acquired through easement.11  Petition-
er’s property was designated as an area that was excluded;12 as a re-
sult, Nelson was denied the opportunity to sell an easement to the 
Watershed Agricultural Council and sued the City of New York.13 
The Appellate Division, Third Department, reached two con-
clusions.14  First, relying on the right of towns to enact regulations 
and resolutions, the court held that the enacted resolution was not an 
abuse of power and did not violate Nelson’s due process rights.15  
The court then examined three factors: (1) the economic effect; (2) 
the interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations; and 
(3) the character of the governmental action in order to determine if a 
de facto taking occurred.16  After a fact based inquiry, the court con-
cluded that Nelson did not satisfy the required economic deprivation 
to succeed on a takings claim.17 
Case law establishes that the character of the governmental 
regulation is presumptively legitimate, thus creating only one factor 
to prove: the amount of economic loss the property owner sustained.  
After examining the financial loss it is likely that a limitation on the 
transferability of an interest in one’s property will not rise to the re-
quired loss necessary to prevail on a takings claim.  Thus, a property 
owner will unlikely prevail on a regulatory takings claim when there 
 
7 985 N.Y.S 2d at 330-31. 
8 Watersheds, EPA, http://water.epa.gov/type/watersheds/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2015) 
(stating that the purpose of imposing regulations on the watershed is to preserve our coun-
try’s water resources). 
9 Nelson, 985 N.Y.S.2d at 330-31. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 331. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Nelson, 985 N.Y.S.2d at 332-33. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 333; see Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
17 Nelson, 985 N.Y.S.2d at 333. 
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is an elimination of just one potential purchaser. 
Over time, the United States Supreme Court and various New 
York State courts have set the stage for an expansion of the govern-
ment’s ability to disguise a “taking” as a regulation.  This Case Note 
will explore how federal and New York State courts have approached 
allegations of de facto takings resulting from the implementation of 
regulations.  This analysis will begin with an examination of federal 
case law.  This Note will then discuss New York’s implementation of 
the federal approach, followed by how New York has specifically 
addressed claims of regulatory takings.  Lastly, the federal and New 
York State approaches to the issue will be compared. 
II. NELSON AND THE WATERSHED MEMORANDUM 
AGREEMENT 
In 2001, petitioner, Paula Nelson, purchased a farm in the wa-
tershed in the Village of Andes, Delaware County.18  Prior to Nel-
son’s purchase, the City of New York, the Environmental Protection 
Agency, the Department of Environmental Conservation (“DEC”), 
the New York City Department of Environmental Protection 
(“DEP”), and the Coalition of Watershed Towns executed the 1997 
Watershed Memorandum Agreement19 (“MOA”).20  The New York 
City Watershed provides drinking water to about nine million people 
and covers 2,000 square miles in parts of eight counties north of the 
city.21  Ninety percent of the water comes from the Catskill/Delaware 
system located west of the Hudson River.22  DEP has authority, sub-
ject to the Department of Health’s approval, to enforce regulations to 
 
18 Id. at 330; supra note 9. 
19 Conservation Easements: About the CE Program, WATERSHED AGRIC. COUNCIL, 
http://www.nycwatershed.org/ce_about.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2015) (“WAC's Conserva-
tion Easement Program was initially prescribed in the 1997 New York City Watershed 
Memorandum of Agreement as part of the Land Acquisition Program (LAP).  The LAP 
seeks to acquire land and conservation easements in the West of Hudson watershed for the 
purposes of protecting New York City's drinking water supply.  The LAP includes programs 
managed by the New York City Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) for the ac-
quisition of fee land and conservation easements as well as WAC's program, which acquires 
conservation easements (CEs) on qualified agricultural properties in the New York City wa-
tershed.”). 
20 Nelson, 985 N.Y.S.2d at 330. 
21 Worchester Creameries Corp. v. City of New York, 861 N.Y.S.2d 198, 200 (App. Div. 
3d Dep’t 2008). 
22 Id. 
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protect the water supply within the watershed.23  Under the MOA, the 
City could acquire land in specified upstate New York counties for 
the purpose of protecting the watershed.”24  Nelson’s property was 
excluded from absolute acquisition.25  However, the Agreement did 
allow the City to acquire a conservation easement.26  In 2006, Nelson 
attempted to sell a conservation easement to the Watershed Agricul-
tural Council; however, these efforts were unsuccessful and did not 
result in a sale.27 
In 2010, a permit was issued that allowed the City to continue 
the land and easement acquisitions within the watershed.28  The per-
mit included a condition, which would exclude certain geographical 
areas from acquisition by the City if the municipality designated such 
areas as hamlets.29  The Andes Town Board and the Town Supervisor 
(“respondents”) adopted Resolution No. 3130 (“the Resolution”), 
which excluded acquisition by the City, as per condition No. 10,31 of 
specified property, including Nelson’s farm.32  Following the Resolu-
tion, Nelson sought to annul Resolution No. 31 and commenced an 
action against the City of New York.33  Nelson alleged that the re-
spondents failed to give appropriate notice, denied the public an ade-
 
23 Id. 
24 Nelson, 985 N.Y.S.2d at 330-33; What Is a Conservation Easement, WATERSHED 
AGRIC. COUNCIL, http://www.nycwatershed.org/ce_whatisce.html (last visited Mar. 13, 
2015) (“Generally, conservation easements are either sold or donated by a landowner to a 
qualified conservation organization and constitute a legally binding agreement that may limit 
or condition certain types of uses or activities from occurring on a property in perpetuity or 
prevent development from taking place on a property in perpetuity in order to fulfill the con-
servation purposes of the easement.  Conservation easements function as non-possessory, 
legal covenants on a property.  As such, land owners still possess the property and may sell 
or transfer a property encumbered by an easement.”). 
25 Nelson, 985 N.Y.S.2d at 331. 
26 Id.; see 9A N.Y. PRAC., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND REGULATION IN NEW YORK § 12:5 
(2d ed.). 
27 Nelson, 985 N.Y.S.2d at 331. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. (pursuant to the regulation, the “DEC issued a 15-year water supply permit to 
NYCDEP authorizing continued land and easement acquisitions by the City within the wa-
tershed”). 
31 Id. at 331-32 (“Special condition No. 10 of the DEC permit required municipalities that 
were considering adopting a resolution that excluded certain areas from acquisition by the 
City to, among other things, give appropriate forms of notice and allow a public comment 
period of at least 30 days following such notice.”). 
32 Nelson, 985 N.Y.S.2d. at 331. 
33 Id. 
4
Touro Law Review, Vol. 31 [2015], No. 4, Art. 13
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol31/iss4/13
2015 PURSUIT OF YOUR PROPERTY 875 
quate comment period,34 and acted arbitrarily in adopting Resolution 
No. 31, and that the resolution resulted in a de facto taking of her 
property.35  The Delaware County Supreme Court dismissed the peti-
tion and Nelson appealed.36 
III. NELSON DECIDED 
On appeal, the Appellate Division, Third Department af-
firmed the Delaware County Supreme Court’s decision.37  The Ap-
pellate Court held that Resolution No. 31 did not exceed respondents’ 
authority nor was the implementation of Resolution No. 31 “arbi-
trary, unreasonable or otherwise unlawful.”38  The Appellate Court 
cited three specific reasons for its decision.  First, municipalities 
within their borders have the authority to regulate how land is used.39  
Second, the court found that the regulation served a legitimate pur-
pose, which was to protect the watershed and to preserve the City’s 
economic interest.40  Third, the resolution was not found to be “an 
improper attempt by a local municipality to regulate who owns or oc-
cupies property, but in essence, the withdrawal of one potential pur-
chaser who received a significant benefit.”41  The court concluded 
that the Resolution, denying Nelson the opportunity to sell an interest 
in her property to the City through an easement, was not unlawful 
and did not violate Nelson’s Due Process Rights.42 
 
34 Id. at 332. 
35 Id. at 331. 
36 Id. 
37 Nelson, 985 N.Y.S.2d at 332-33. 
38 Id. at 332; see Rotterdam Ventures, Inc. v. Town Bd. of Rotterdam, 935 N.Y.S.2d 698, 
700 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2011) (“Generally, zoning determinations enjoy a strong presump-
tion of validity and will only be overcome by a showing, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 
determination was arbitrary and unreasonable or otherwise unlawful.”). 
39 Nelson, 985 N.Y.S.2d at 332; see O’Mara v. Town of Wappinger, 879 N.E.2d 148, 152 
(N.Y. 2007) (concluding that a town has an ability to impose reasonable conditions pursuant 
to the approval of petitioner’s subdivision). 
40 Nelson, 985 N.Y.S.2d at 332; see Worcester Creameries Corp., 861 N.Y.S.2d at 200 
(reasoning that the purpose in enacting the Watershed MOA permitted regulations that went 
beyond state and federal law). 
41 Nelson, 985 N.Y.S.2d at 332; see Dexter v. Town Bd. of the Town of Gates, 324 
N.E.2d 870, 871-72 (N.Y. 1957) (concluding that when the town accepted the petitioner’s 
request for rezoning, but instead implemented a regulation, it does not normally amount to a 
taking, unless it specifically targets the petitioner). 
42 Nelson, 985 N.Y.S.2d at 332 (reasoning that respondents complied with the require-
ments of special condition No. 10, “[n]otice was duly given in mid-April 2011, a public 
hearing was held on May 10, 2011 and written comments were permitted until May 20, 
5
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The second conclusion reached by the appellate court was that 
the Resolution did not effect a de facto taking.43  When the govern-
ment takes private property for public use it is required to justly com-
pensate individuals.44  An action is considered a regulatory taking 
when a governmental encroachment does not physically occupy the 
property but instead governmental conditions and regulations are im-
posed on the land to limit its use.45  If a regulatory taking is found to 
exist, the property owner is entitled to just compensation.46 
The court examined three factors to determine if a regulatory 
taking occurred.47  These factors included “the [resolution’s] econom-
ic effect on the landowner, the extent to which the [resolution] inter-
feres with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the char-
acter of the government action.”48  The court found that the resolution 
did not eliminate all economic uses of the property.49  The result of 
the Resolution was that one potential purchaser no longer had the op-
tion to purchase.50  Furthermore, Nelson’s investment backed expec-
tations were not adversely affected because the Resolution did not 
hinder the property’s function as a farm.51  Lastly, the court empha-
sized the purpose behind the Resolution, which was to protect the wa-
tershed.52  The appellate court held that Nelson failed to “meet [the] 




43 Id. at 333. 
44 Id. 
45 Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415. 
46 Id. at 415-16. 
47 Nelson, 985 N.Y.S.2d at 333; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. 
48 Nelson, 985 N.Y.S.2d at 333; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124; see Smith v. Town of 
Mendon, 822 N.E.2d 1214, 1217 (N.Y. 2004). 
49 Nelson, 985 N.Y.S.2d at 333; see also Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 616. 
50 Nelson, 985 N.Y.S.2d at 332. 
51 Id. at 333 (indicating that Nelson failed to balance the “investment back expectation” 
factor in her favor). 
52 Nelson, 985 N.Y.S.2d at 333 (“The purpose of the resolution was to protect the Town's 
potential for growth and economic sustainability, which was one of the many goals of the . . . 
watershed MOA and consistent with an overriding purpose of maintaining a safe, ample and 
relatively inexpensive drinking water supply for the City.”); id. at 332 (“This was part of a 
delicate balance designed to protect the watershed and save the City significant money while 
safeguarding the economic vitality of upstate communities.”). 
53 Id. at 333; see VTR FV, LLC v. Town of Guilderland, 957 N.Y.S.2d 454, 457-58 (App. 
Div. 3d Dep’t 2012) (holding that a taking had not occurred because under the circumstances 
the “amendment served a legitimate governmental interest in expanding affordable housing 
options for seniors in the area, in addition to ‘increasing the tax base and creating jobs.’  Pe-
6
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IV. FEDERAL APPROACH TO THE ISSUE 
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution provides that private property shall not “be taken 
for public use, without just compensation.”54  In examining the plain 
language and purpose behind the Fifth Amendment, case law estab-
lishes that a physical encroachment on an individual’s property is a 
violation of an individual’s right as a property owner.55  However, the 
Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon56 recognized that, 
even if the government does not seize or occupy an individual’s 
property, a governmental regulation can amount to a taking if it “goes 
too far.”57  In striking down a statute which prevented Pennsylvania 
Coal Company from mining coal from a property that it had acquired, 
the Court reasoned that the statute failed to further the public interest 
and destroyed all of Pennsylvania Coal’s “existing property and con-
tract rights” in that piece of property.58 
The United States Supreme Court further elaborated on this 
“goes too far” premise in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.59  
Lucas commenced an action claiming that South Carolina’s Beach-
front Management Act effected a taking.60  The Act required property 
owners to obtain a permit before building any permanent structures 
on the designated lots.61  Lucas had acquired the property prior to the 
 
titioners have not established that the amendment interfered with their investment-backed 
expectations, particularly in light of the fact that there have apparently been no plans to build 
a skilled nursing facility on the phase IV site for over 17 years.”). 
54 U.S. CONST. amend. V; Armstrong v. United States 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (“Fifth 
Amendment's guarantee . . . [is] designed to bar Government from forcing some people 
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public 
as a whole.”). 
55 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435-38; supra note 2 (the right to exclude is included in one’s bun-
dle of property rights). 
56 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
57 Id. at 415-16 (emphasizing that holding otherwise would put the country “in danger of 
forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to war-
rant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the 
change”); see also Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49 (concluding a taking could be found when a 
property owner is “alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be 
borne by the public as a whole”). 
58 Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413-14 (“The extent of the public interest shown by the statute is 
limited, since the statute ordinarily does not apply to land when the surface is owned by the 
owner of the coal.”). 
59 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
60 Id. at 1009. 
61 Id. at 1008. 
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enactment of the Act with the intention to construct single-family res-
idences.62  The passage of the Act ended Lucas’s construction.63  Lu-
cas filed suit, claiming that the Act resulted in a complete diminish-
ment of his property’s value.64  The trial court found that the Act 
effected a taking and Lucas was entitled to just compensation because 
of the loss in value to the property.65  The South Carolina Supreme 
Court reversed the decision and concluded that no compensation was 
owed, no matter the economic effect on the property, when a regula-
tion is designed “to prevent serious public harm.”66  However, the 
United States Supreme Court agreed with the trial court and held that 
a regulation which “declares ‘off-limits’ all economically productive 
or beneficial uses of land,” requires compensation under the Takings 
Clause.67 
Issues arise in instances when the economic loss does not 
amount to a complete diminishment in value to the property owner.  
In these cases, once a claim is deemed ripe,68 the court will then ex-
amine and balance the following factors to determine if there was a 
regulatory taking: (1) the economic impact on the property owner; (2) 
the interference with distinct investment-backed expectations; and (3) 
the character of the governmental regulation.  These factors derive 
from Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,69 the piv-
otal case on the issue of regulatory takings.  In Penn Central, New 
York City’s Landmark Preservation Law70 required Penn Central to 
 
62 Id. (like much of his neighbors). 
63 Id. 
64 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1009. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 1009-10. 
67 Id. at 1030. 
68 Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 
172, 186 (1985) (“[A] claim that the application of government regulations effects a taking 
of a property interest is not ripe until the government entity charged with implementing the 
regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the 
property at issue.”). 
69 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
70 The Court noted two reasons behind such laws: 
[T]he first is recognition that, in recent years, large number of historic 
structures, landmarks, and areas have been destroyed without adequate 
consideration of either the values represented therein or the possibility of 
preserving the destroyed properties for use in economically productive 
ways.  The second is a widely shared belief that structures with special 
historic, cultural, or architectural significance enhance the quality of life 
for all. 
8
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keep its property in good condition and required the Landmark 
Commission’s approval prior to any proposed construction.71  Penn 
Central desired to build an office building above the already existing 
railroad terminal.72  Pursuant to the requirement of the Landmark 
Preservation Law, Penn Central applied to the Commission for per-
mission to do so.73  The Commission denied Penn Central’s pro-
posal.74  Penn Central claimed that it was entitled to just compensa-
tion due to the impediment to construction of the property as a result 
of the Landmark Preservation Law.75  The New York appellate court 
held that the law did not effect a regulatory taking,76 a decision af-
firmed by the New York Court of Appeals.77  After granting certiora-
ri, the Supreme Court decided “whether the restrictions imposed by 
New York City’s law upon appellants’ exploitation of the terminal 
site effect a ‘taking’ of the appellants’ property for public use within 
the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.”78  The Court adopted a bal-
ancing approach and established three factors to be examined when 
engaging in a factual inquiry to determine whether a regulation has 
“gone too far” to amount to a taking.79 
The first factor examined was the economic impact of the 
government’s regulation on the claimant.80  Prior to addressing this 
factor the Court rejected Penn Central’s argument that a taking oc-
curred simply because it no longer had the ability to “exploit a prop-
erty interest that they . . . believed was available for development.”81  
On this point, the Court concluded that the property is looked at as a 
whole to determine if a taking had occurred.82  The Court found that 
 
Id. at 107-09. 
71 Id. at 110-12 (“[D]ecisions concerning construction on the landmark site are made with 
due consideration of both the public interest in the maintenance of the structure and the 
landowner’s interest in use of the property.”). 
72 Id. at 116. 
73 Id. 
74 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 117. 
75 Id. at 119. 
76 Id. (concluding that “the restrictions on the development of the Terminal site were nec-
essary to promote the legitimate public purpose of protecting landmarks and therefore that 
[Penn Central] could sustain their constitutional claims only by proof that the regulation de-
prived them of all reasonable beneficial use of the property”). 
77 Id. at 120-21. 
78 Id. at 122. 
79 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. 
80 Id. at 129-31. 
81 Id. at 130. 
82 Id. at 130-31. 
9
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the New York City law did not impede any of the current uses of the 
Terminal.83 
The second factor focused on the extent to which the regula-
tion interfered with Penn Central’s distinct investment backed expec-
tations.  The Court found that the New York City law did not impede 
Penn Central’s investment backed expectations because Penn Central 
still had the ability to profit from the property because it continued to 
function as a terminal.84  Furthermore, the Court concluded that under 
the circumstances, Penn Central failed to seek approval for the con-
struction of a smaller structure.85  Lastly, the Court rationalized that it 
was unknown if Penn Central “will be denied any use of any portion 
of the airspace above the Terminal.”86 
The last factor is the character of the governmental action.87  
“A ‘taking’ may more readily be found when the interference with 
property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government 
than when interference arises from some public program adjusting 
the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common 
good.”88  Furthermore, when the state concludes that, “ ‘the health, 
safety, morals, or general welfare’ would be promoted by prohibiting 
particular contemplated uses of land,” the governmental interest is 
likely to be deemed acceptable.89 
The Supreme Court concluded that the implementation of 
New York City’s Landmarks Law did not constitute a “taking.”90  
Penn Central failed to swing any of the three factors in its favor.91  
The Penn Central holding simply created a template of factors to be 
examined by a reviewing court.92  The Supreme Court failed to clear-
 
83 Id. at 136 (noting that the “New York City law as permitting Penn Central not only to 
profit from the Terminal but also to obtain a ‘reasonable return’ on its investment”). 
84 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136. 
85 Id. at 136-37 (Specifically denied the ability to construct an office building in excess of 
50-stories). 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 124-25; see also Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, N.Y., 369 U.S. 590, 595-96 
(1962) (finding that “[t]o evaluate [the law’s] reasonableness we therefore need to know 
such things as the nature of the menace against which it will protect, the availability and ef-
fectiveness of other less drastic protective steps, and the loss which appellants will suffer 
from the imposition of the ordinance”). 
88 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. 
89 Id. at 125. 
90 Id. at 138. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 124. 
10
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ly define each factor in a way that it may be applied to different cir-
cumstances, and as a result both federal and state courts have been 
flooded with cases concerning losses of different dollar amounts and 
a variety of different regulations.  To apply the factors to Nelson’s 
claim it is necessary to establish how the federal case law elaborated 
on each factor in a wide variety of different circumstances. 
A. First Factor: The Economic Impact 
The Supreme Court frequently analyzes the first factor by in-
quiring in depth into the economic deprivation the property owner 
sustained as a result of the imposed regulation.  This is evident in 
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,93 in which the petitioner, Palazzolo, 
owned property that was designated as a coastal wetland under Rhode 
Island law.94  Pursuant to the law, Palazzolo was required to submit 
development plans for acceptance prior to undertaking any construc-
tion.95  The Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council re-
jected Palazzolo’s development proposals.96  As a result, Palazzolo 
sued in Rhode Island Superior Court, asserting that the Council’s ap-
plication of its wetlands regulations took his property without just 
compensation in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.97  The Superior Court ruled against Palazzolo.98 
On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the de-
cision.99  The Rhode Island Supreme Court found that Palazzolo 
failed to demonstrate that he was deprieved of all economically bene-
ficial use of his land.100  This conclusion was supported by the fact 
that Palazzolo had $200,000 in development value remaining on a 
portion of the realty.101  The Supreme Court of the United States 
agreed with the Rhode Island Supreme Court and held that the “own-
er is not deprived of all economic use of his property because the 
 
93 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
94 Id. at 611. 
95 Id. at 614-15. 
96 Id. at 611. 
97 Id. (the Fifth Amendment is binding upon the State through the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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value of upland portions is substantial.”102  Specifically, Palazzolo 
was still able to build a residence on 18-acres of the property.103 
B. Second Factor: Interference with Distinct 
Investment-Backed Expectations 
The economic expectation factor of the property owner was 
addressed in Hodel v. Irving,104 in which the Supreme Court clearly 
defined when a regulation poses an unacceptable regulation on prop-
erty owners.105  Hodel, the petitioner, claimed that a provision of the 
Indian Land Consolidation Act effected a taking because it denied the 
property owner the ability to freely pass the property to another at 
death.106  The congressional purpose of the Act was to promote con-
solidation of the Indians’ land.107  The South Dakota District Court 
held that the Act did not effect an unconstitutional taking because 
Congress has the authority to regulate the intestate passage of proper-
ty.108  On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed and held that the de-
scendants had a right to control the property after a decedent’s death 
and, thus, had standing to allege a takings claim.109  The Supreme 
Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit’s decision and concluded that the 
regulation “goes too far.”110  The Court reasoned that abolishing the 
right to devise one’s property interests deemed the restriction on al-
ienation unconstitutional.111 
C. Third Factor: The Character of the Governmental 
Action 
The third Penn Central factor is elaborated on in a series of 
cases in which the Supreme Court examined the connection between 
the regulation and the promotion of a legitimate state interest.112  The 
 
102 Id. at 616, 631-32 (The Court rejected Palazzolo’s argument that the property should 
be looked at as separately instead of as a whole). 
103 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 631. 
104 481 U.S. 704 (1987). 
105 Id. at 718. 
106 Id. at 709. 
107 Id. at 712. 
108 Id. at 710. 
109 Hodel, 481 U.S. at 710. 
110 Id. at 718. 
111 Id. 
112 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124-25. 
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inconsistencies in the tests used to determine whether the character of 
the governmental action is legitimate cannot be ignored when exam-
ining this factor.  For instance, in Agins v. City of Tiburon,113 the Su-
preme Court addressed the issue and developed the “substantially ad-
vances” inquiry.114  The Court found that “[t]he application of general 
zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance 
does not substantially advance legitimate state interests.”115 
However, in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,116 the Supreme 
Court rejected the standard established in Agins and held that the sub-
stantially advances inquiry is not appropriate for a takings cause of 
action because the “the Takings Clause presupposes that the govern-
ment has acted pursuant to a valid public purpose.”117  In essence, 
Lingle made it easier for a court to rule in favor of the government 
because the “rationally related” language means rational basis is the 
standard of review, resulting in a very low threshold for the govern-
ment to satisfy.118 
V. ANALYSIS OF NELSON’S “TAKING” 
The court’s application of the Penn Central balancing test be-
gins with an inquiry into the economic loss the property owner sus-
tained.  If the regulation resulted in a complete financial deprivation, 
the Lucas analysis leads to the conclusion that there was a per se tak-
ing which requires just compensation and the analysis is over.  If the 
financial loss is not a total deprivation and there is some beneficial 
use of the property, then the court continues with an examination of 
Penn Central’s other two factors.  Under the circumstances, the ar-
gument is very persuasive in that an application of the approach in 
Lucas is not appropriate to determine whether Nelson’s property was 
unjustly taken.  Lucas concerned a regulatory taking in which all 
 
113 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
114 Id. at 260-61. 
115 Id. at 260. 
116 544 U.S. 528 (2005).  The Court in Lingle was faced with the issue of what is the ap-
propriate test for determining whether a regulation effects a Fifth Amendment taking.  Id. at 
532.  The Hawaii Legislature implemented a law limiting the rent that oil companies may 
charge to dealers who lease services stations owned by the companies.  Id.  The lower courts 
used the “substantially advances” analysis and concluded there was a taking because the 
regulation did not advance Hawaii’s interest with respect to controlling gas prices.  Id. 
117 Id. at 543. 
118 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543. 
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economic uses of the property were affected.119  Nelson was not de-
prived of all economic use of her property.120  Although Nelson was 
unable to sell an easement to the City, she still had the ability to sell 
the property to other buyers.121 
Using the balancing test, the court must determine whether 
the removal of one potential buyer is a sufficient economic burden to 
entitle Nelson to compensation.  Nelson still had the ability to use the 
property for the purpose for which it was acquired and maintained the 
ability  to sell it, just to one less potential purchaser.122  The Court 
found that the inability to sell an interest in one’s property to whom-
ever he or she pleases does not demonstrate an interference with a 
property owner’s expectation.  Nelson was only unable to sell an in-
terest to the City; however, Nelson retained the ability to sell an in-
terest in her property to any other purchaser.123 
Lastly, Nelson failed to establish the lack of a governmental 
interest.  Under the rational basis analysis, the MOA could reasona-
bly be found to further a legitimate state interest.  The MOA is not 
excessive and does not impose a condition that would be deemed un-
reasonable.124  Although case law provides that the Lucas analysis 
should only be used when the property owner is completely denied 
economic use of the property, the inconsistency in the application of 
the takings test provides that there could be a possibility to extend the 
test to less severe economic claims. 
VI. NEW YORK STATE APPROACH TO THE REGULATORY 
TAKINGS ISSUE 
Due Process requires that the states guarantee to all individu-
als the rights associated with the Fifth Amendment.125  Further, article 
I of the New York Constitution mirrors the United States Constitution 
provision that protects an individual’s property rights.126  The New 
 
119 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030. 
120 Nelson, 985 N.Y.S.2d at 332-33. 
121 Id. at 333. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 332. 
124 See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979) (holding “where an owner possesses a 
full ‘bundle’ of property rights, the destruction of one ‘strand’ of the bundle is not a taking 
because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety”). 
125 Chicago, B & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). 
126 N.Y. CONST. art. I. § 7. 
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York Constitution specifically states, “[p]rivate property shall not be 
taken for public use without just compensation.”127  Nevertheless, the 
federal courts’ inconsistency on how to approach the regulatory tak-
ing issue is not mirrored in the New York case law.  New York State 
has implemented a variation on the Penn Central factors test to de-
termine if a regulatory taking has occurred.  The New York courts 
have balanced the factors slightly differently than the federal courts 
have.  Consequently, this variation leaves just one factor for the court 
to consider: the amount of economic deprivation. 
A. The Only Factor that Counts—Economic Loss 
Although the New York courts have applied the Penn Central 
balancing test to claims of regulatory takings, the weight given to 
each factor is different from the weight given by federal courts.  The 
case specific inquiry into the economic effect of a regulation is evi-
dence of the greater weight the economic loss is given over the basi-
cally one remaining factor, character of the governmental action. 
This uneven balancing scheme is evident in Chase Manhattan 
Bank, N.A. v. State.128  In Chase Manhattan Bank, the State of New 
York imposed the Tidal Wetlands Act, which denied the petitioner 
the ability to develop its property for residential purposes.129  The 
Appellate Division applied the Penn Central test and concluded that a 
wetland regulation, which deprived the property owner of all finan-
cially rewarding uses of the property and reduced the property’s val-
ue by 86%, could potentially effect a de facto taking.130  The court al-
so examined the character of the regulation, and although the 
petitioner still had the option to develop the property for environmen-
tal and recreational purposes, found the diminution in the property’s 
value was considered to be too great and, therefore, amounted to a 
taking requiring the State to compensate the plaintiff.131 
Using a similar analysis in In re City of New York,132 the 
Richmond County, Supreme Court held that a wetlands regulation did 
 
127 Id. § 7(a). 
128 479 N.Y.S.2d 983 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1984). 
129 Id. at 985-86. 
130 Id. at 992. 
131 Id. at 989-90. 
132 No. 4018/07, 2012 WL 1676889 (Sup. Ct. Richmond County May 7, 2007). 
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in fact result in a taking.133  The court acknowledged that just because 
“regulations may prohibit any development or economic use of a 
property does not necessarily mean that the regulations have de-
stroyed all or all but a residue of the property’s economic value.”134  
However, an “82% [sic] reduction in value, when taken together with 
the character of the regulations, which require the property to remain 
vacant, and do not allow any productive use of the property” was 
considered a severe enough economic loss to be considered a regula-
tory taking.135 
On the other hand, in Putnam County National Bank v. City of 
New York,136 the Appellate Division, Second Department concluded 
that even if a regulation is found to substantially reduce the proper-
ty’s value or deny the owner the most beneficial use of the property it 
does not effect a taking.137  Putnam County National Bank, the peti-
tioner, as a result of the regulation, incurred a 20% diminution in the 
property’s value.138  The Bank claimed that the enforcement of a Wa-
tershed Act constituted a regulatory taking and demanded just com-
pensation.139  The Appellate Division affirmed the New York Su-
preme Court and granted the City’s motion to dismiss.140 
The trend in examining the financial loss of the property own-
er in the New York case law continued in Worchester Creameries 
Corp. v. City of New York.141  The petitioner, Worchester Creameries 
Corp., challenged the same Watershed Act that Nelson challenged, 
under slightly different circumstances.142  The New York City Water-
shed regulations required Worchester Creameries Corp. to finance 
upgrades to its private watershed water treatment plant.143  The issue 
before the court was the “extent to which defendant City of New 
York is obligated to pay costs incurred by owners of private water-
shed treatment plants for the expense of complying with regulations 
that apply only in the New York City Watershed and exceed all state 
 
133 Id. at *6. 
134 Id. at *2. 
135 Id. at *6. 
136 829 N.Y.S.2d 661 (2007). 
137 Id. at 663; see also Gazza, 679 N.E.2d at 1042-43. 
138 Putnam Cnty. Nat’l Bank, 829 N.Y.S.2d at 662. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 663. 
141 861 N.Y.S.2d 198 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2008). 
142 Id. at 199. 
143 Id. 
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and federal regulations.”144  The City argued that pursuant to the con-
tract entered into the City was not responsible to pay the costs for up-
grades beyond 30 years and for the costs of expansion of Waterwaste 
Treatment Plants.145  The trial court granted Worchester Creameries 
summary judgment motion, thus holding that the City was to pay the 
cost to update the system so it complied with the imposed condi-
tions.146  On appeal, the Appellate Division, Third Department agreed 
with the lower court’s decision.147  The appellate court examined the 
intent of the Watershed MOA and determined that the desire to en-
sure economic vitality could not be achieved if the property owner 
were to finance the upgrades that exceeded both state and federal 
law.148 
The New York case law, in contrast to the federal case law, 
created a preliminary test that is required prior to implementing the 
Penn Central balancing test.  The “diminution in value” test is used 
to determine whether the property owner has experienced an econom-
ic loss.  To succeed on the factor concerning economic loss, the dim-
inution of the property’s value must be great or the additional ex-
penses incurred by the property owner, in order to adhere to a 
regulation, must be unreasonable. 
B. Investment-Backed Expectations 
New York case law has examined the investment-backed ex-
pectation and established that it is not easy for a property owner to 
prevail on this factor.  For example, in Gazza v. New York State De-
partment of Environmental Conservation,149 the Court of Appeals ad-
dressed an allegation that a regulation protecting the wetlands result-
ed in a regulatory taking.150  Gazza had petitioned to the DEC seeking 
a variance in order to construct two structures on his property.151  The 
DEC concluded that such variances would have a negative impact 
 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 200-02. 
146 Worchester Creameries Corp., 861 N.Y.S.2d at 201. 
147 Id. at 203. 
148 Id. at 201-03 (Section 141 of the MOA provides: “The City further agrees to pay the 
annual costs of operating and maintaining such Regulatory Upgrades. . . .”  The court inter-
prets the term “Regulatory Upgrades” to intend to be construed expansively.). 
149 679 N.E.2d 1035 (1997). 
150 Id. at 1036. 
151 Id. at 1036-37. 
17
Miller: Pursuit of Your Property
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2015
888 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 31 
and denied Gazza’s petition.152  The New York Court of Appeals 
used the Penn Central factors and found that Gazza was not deprived 
of any investment-backed interest, reasoning that the regulation was 
in place prior to Gazza’s purchase of the property; therefore, his rea-
sonable economic expectations were not denied.153  Further, the court 
found that the property had other uses that were not prohibited, such 
as developing the property for recreational use.154  In doing so, the 
court concluded that no taking occurred.155 
The New York court’s interpretation of an investment-backed 
expectation established that the denial of the most beneficial use of 
the land alone does not constitute a taking.  For the factor to swing in 
favor of the property owner, the impediment of an economic expecta-
tion must be grave.  The removal of the opportunity to sell an ease-
ment to one purchaser will unlikely be found as a diminishment to 
one’s investment-backed expectations. 
C. The Character Examined 
The character of the governmental action in virtually every 
case seems to promote a governmental interest, thus balancing the 
character of the action adversely to the property owner in favor of the 
governmental action.  For instance, in de St. Aubin v. Flacke,156 the 
petitioner’s property was deemed tidal wetlands.157  The petitioner 
was denied a permit to develop the wetland portion of the land by the 
Commissioner of Environmental Conservation.158  A property owner 
who claims a regulatory taking must triumph over two obstacles in 
order to demonstrate the unreasonableness of the imposed regula-
tion.159  The first obstacle is “overcoming the presumption of consti-
tutionality” of the regulation.160  The second obstacle is the require-
ment that all the elements of the cause of action are proved “beyond a 
 
152 Id. at 1036. 
153 Id. at 1043. 
154 Gazza, 679 N.E.2d at 1043. 
155 Id. 
156 496 N.E.2d 879 (N.Y. 1986). 
157 Id. at 881 (the Tidal Wetlands Act provides that “properties designated by the Com-
missioner of Environmental Conservation as tidal wetlands of the State . . . are subject to 
‘rigorous regulation’ ”). 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 885. 
160 Id. 
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reasonable doubt.”161  That being said, the court goes on to define 
when restrictions are acceptable “if they are reasonably related to the 
public health, safety and welfare and are not confiscatory.”162  Con-
sequently, the landowner “must establish that the regulation attacked 
so restricts his property that he is precluded from using it for any 
purpose for which it is reasonably adapted” in order to be success-
ful.163  The petitioner in this case failed to meet that heavy burden and 
did not prevail on a takings claim.164 
Further elaboration of this factor is demonstrated in Bonnie 
Briar Syndicate, Inc. v. Town of Mamaroneck.165  The plaintiff al-
leged that a regulatory taking had occurred when her property had 
been zoned for solely recreational use.166  The New York Court of 
Appeals cited to federal case law, and adopted the premise that “the 
regulatory actions of the city or any agency substantially advanc[e] a 
legitimate public purpose if the action bears a reasonable relationship 
to that objective.”167  After a careful analysis of the circumstances 
surrounding both the regulation and the petitioner’s property the 
court held that the zoning has “reasonable relation to the legitimate 
objectives stated within that law (to further open space, recreational 
opportunities and flood control), the regulatory action here substan-
tially advances those purposes.”168 
A property owner rarely succeeds on the claim that a govern-
mental regulation does not promote a state’s interest.  The character 
of the regulation is presumed to be in furtherance of the interest of 
the government.  As a result, a property owner is unlikely to prevail 
on this factor when the courts apply the Penn Central balancing test. 
VII. COMPARING THE FEDERAL APPROACH AND THE NEW YORK 
STATE APPROACH 
The New York courts have approached the issue of regulatory 
takings by balancing the Penn Central factors.  After examining the 
New York implementation of the Penn Central approach, it is evident 
 
161 de St. Aubin, 496 N.E.2d at 885. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 885. 
164 Id. at 881-82. 
165 721 N.E.2d 971 (N.Y. 1999). 
166 Id. at 972 (the plaintiff’s property was being used as a golf course). 
167 Id. at 975-76. 
168 Id. at 976. 
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that New York’s balancing of the factors is distinct from that of the 
federal court’s approach.  For instance, a feature of New York State’s 
case law is the heavier emphasis the courts put on the economic ef-
fects a regulation poses.  New York courts have also approached the 
character of the governmental action factor more concisely than the 
federal courts.  This approach has made it almost impossible for a 
property owner to prevail on this factor. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
An important caveat of the case law demonstrates that litiga-
tion in this area is likely to continue because the courts insist upon a 
fact specific, case-by-case, inquiry into each taking allegation.  The 
Supreme Court has recognized that there is no “set-formula” in de-
termining whether a regulation amounts to an injury that requires 
compensation.169 Each claim of a regulatory taking is unique, and as a 
result, a lack of consistency among the federal and state courts has 
developed.  That being said, environmental regulations pose a unique 
circumstance in which the application of the Penn Central factors is 
skewed.  The only factor the court considers, when a challenged 
regulation is environmental, is the economic loss to the property 
owner. The Court has never explicitly overturned Penn Central; 
however, the development of specific per se approaches has contorted 
the balancing scheme.  The Penn Central factors test may be inap-
propriate under the circumstances because, the reality is, the factors 
are not being balanced.  For the great majority of cases, the court’s 
analysis turns on the economic impact that the regulation has on the 
claimant. 
The New York appellate court, without a doubt, adds to the 
case law setting the stage for an expansion of regulations, as a result 
transforming what the definition of an actual taking is.  On November 
20, 2014, the New York Court of Appeals denied Nelson’s motion 
for leave to appeal.170  If the case were decided on appeal, it is unlike-
ly Nelson’s “taking” claim will succeed.  The courts have created an 
uphill battle for property owners claiming de facto takings that do not 
result in a grave loss of economic value.  As a result, it is unlikely 
that Nelson’s loss will be considered great enough to rise to the eco-
nomic deprivation required for a successful takings claim. 
 
169 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. 
170 23 N.E.3d 153 (2014). 
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